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State Trading Monopolies in the European
Economic Community
Ernst-Joachim Mestmcker*
I. NATuRE AN SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Legal Framework
Governments have long recognized state trading monopolies as
convenient devices to achieve political and commercial objectives
concurrently, using the leverage of their economic power to political
ends and vice versa. The effectiveness of the Boston Tea Party, and
its aftermath, in adjusting state trading monopolies to the require-
ments of free trade settled the problem for the United States only.
Thus, when the parties to the Treaty of Rome' agreed to divest
themselves of their control over intra-Community trade by the es-
tablishment of a customs union, they were faced with the problems
posed by their trading monopolies as well.
The state trading monopolies are business enterprises. As such
they are expected to take advantage of the abolition of trade barriers
and to enter new markets. For their competitors, however, there
remains but one entry to the monopoly's own market, that being
through the monopoly itself. In thus channeling export and import
trade, the monopoly is in a position to exercise both that freedom
of trade the treaty guarantees and that national control of intra-
Community trade the treaty proscribes.
The abolition of trade barriers is to be implemented by "the es-
tablishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Common
Market is not distorted" (article 3(f)). To this end rules of
competition (articles 85 to 94) govern the conduct of enterprises
in trade among member states. This "order of competition," accord-
ing to the Court of Justice, "has been designed because the Treaty
cannot permit enterprises to create barriers in the trade among Mem-
ber-States of a type the Treaty aims to eliminate according to its
0 Professor of Law, University of Miinster/Westphalia; Director, Institute for
Foreign and International Trade Law, University of Miinster; Advisor, Commission of
the European Economic Community.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be taken to
reflect those of the Commission.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957.
Reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958). All references to the provisions of the Rome
Treaty are to the unofficial translation of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London.
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preamble and its other provisions establishing a Common Market."2
Again, state trading monopolies resist a simple application of these
rules.
The Rome Treaty deals with state trading monopolies in article
37,3 this provision being part of the chapter concerned with the elimi-
nation of quantitative restrictions. Article 90 paragraph 1, however,
imposes an affirmative duty upon the member states in respect of
public enterprises and enterprises to which they grant special or
exclusive rights to "neither introduce nor maintain in force any
measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
to those rules provided for in article 7 and articles 85 to 94 inclusive."4
2. Verbundene Rechtssachen 56/64 & 58/64, Consten GmbH & Grundig Verkaufs-
GmbH v. Kommission der EWG, July 13, 1966, XII Sammlung der Rechtsprechung
des Gerichtshofs der Europiiischen Gemeinschiiften 322, 388, 394 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Sammlung]; CCH Com. MKT. RE . ff 8046, at 7651, 7654 (1966).
3. Article 37 reads:
1. Member States shall gradually adjust any State trading monopolies so as to
ensure that, when the transitional period expires, no discrimination exists between
the nationals of Member States as regards the supply or marketing of goods.
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any organisation through which a
Member State, de jure or de facto, either directly or indirectly controls, super-
vises or appreciably influences imports or exports as between Member States.
These provisions shall likewise apply to monopolies delegated by the State to
other legal entities.
2. Member States shall abstain from introducing any new measure which is
contrary to the principles laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article or which
restricts the scope of the Articles dealing with the abolition of customs duties
and quantitative restrictions between Member States.
3. The timetable for the measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be harmonised
'with the abolition of the quantitative restrictions on the same products, as provided
for in Articles 30 to 34 inclusive
If a product is subject to a State trading monopoly in only one or some Member
States, the Commission may authorize the other Member States to impose pro-
tective measures until the adjustment provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article
-has been effected; the Commission shall decide upon the conditions governing
such measures and determine the manner in which effect shall be given to them.
4. If a State trading monopoly has rules which are designed to facilitate the
distribution or marketing of agricultural products, the rules contained in this
Article shall be given effect to in such manner that equivalent guarantees are
provided, in respect of the employment and standard of living of the producers
concerned; account shall be taken of possible adjustments and of necessary
specialisations.
5. The obligations on Member States shall be binding only in so far as they
are consistent with existing international agreements.
6. At the beginning of the first stage the Commission shall make recommenda-
tions as to the manner of effecting the adjustment provided for in this Article
and the timetable which shall govern it.
4. Article 90 reads:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which they grant
special or exclusive rights, Member. States shall neither introduce nor maintain
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94 inclusive.
2. Any concern entrusted with the management of services of general economic
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Taken together, articles 37 and 90 point to the close interrelation
between the establishment of a customs union and the establishment
of a system of undistorted competition-an interrelationship which
characterizes the Common Market, which distinguishes the Rome
Treaty from other schemes of regulating state trading in commercial
treaties, and which will of necessity serve as the single most.important
guide to its interpretation and application. Of course, the system-
atic position of these provisions coincides with differences in the
substance of their regulation. In putting state trading into the per-
spective of comparable issues in international trade in general, this
special aspect of the Rome Treaty emerges with a singular clarity.
As a matter of history, of economic relevance and of legal technique,
state trading lends itself to analysis in the separate contexts of (1)
tariffs and quantitative restrictions and (2) a policy of competition.
1. State Trading and Trade Barriers.-Bilateral and multilateral
commercial treaties concerning the reduction of tariffs, the regulation
of quotas, and the application of most-favoured-nation clauses have
to take into account the divergent effects of such agreements when
applied to an economy, or a sector of an economy, characterized by
state trading. Those effects of liberalizing trade, which automatically
follow from the removal of trade barriers in a private enterprise
system, do not necessarily ensue if one of the states concerned is
itself engaged in trade.
Since no commercial treaty can make it obligatory for enterprises
to take advantage of trading possibilities, such a state, for reasons
of its own, may refuse to avail itself of the trading possibilities
afforded by the treaty without thereby violating the letter of its
obligations. This discretion, enjoyed as a matter of course by private
enterprises, leaves the state 'as an entrepreneur virtually with that
very freedom of action-a freedom to restrict trade-which the treaty
was intended to regulate. _
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization5
for the first time undertook to integrate state trading into a general
interest or having the character of a fiscal monopoly shall be subject to the rules
contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules of competition, in so far as
the application of such rules does not obstruct the de jure or de facto fulfilment
of the specific tasks entrusted to such concerns. The development of trade shall
not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the
Community.
3. The Commission shall see that effect is given to the provisions of this Article
and shall, where necessary, issue appropriate directives or decisions to the Member
States.
5. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana, Cuba,
from Nov. 21, 1947, to March 24, 1948. Final Act and related documents, Chapter IV,
section D (State Trading and Related Matters), arts. 29-32 (Mar. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as Havana Charter].
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system of free trade. Although it has remained in draft form, it has
substantially influenced later treaties, including the Treaty of Rome.6
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 7 having
adopted the outlines of the Havana Charter, considers state trading
in the context of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Import mo-
nopolies are proscribed from operating so as to afford protection in
excess of the amount of protection afforded by tariffs in general."
The protection afforded domestic producers is to be determined by
comparing the "landed cost" of a product (including tariffs) with
a defined "fimport mark-up."9 In addition, all provisions relating to
quantitative restrictions are applicable to restrictions effected by state-
trading operations. 10
The rule of non-discrimination, as specified by the rule of general
most-favored-nation treatment" and by the non-discriminatory ad-
ministration of quantitative restrictionslz has been adapted to the
special problems of state trading. State enterprises and enterprises
to which a contracting party grants, formally or in fact, exclusive or
special privileges are required to follow a policy in accordance with
commercial considerations and, furthermore, to afford the enterprises
of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in
such purchases or sales.' 3 However, the implementation of these rules
is limited to a formal recognition that state enterprise might be
operated so as to create serious obstacles to trade. "[T]hus negoti-
ations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis designed to
limit or reduce such obstacles are of importance to the expansion of
international trade."14 Information about the operation of article 17
enterprises may be requested whenever a contracting party has reason
to believe that its interests are thereby adversely affected.15
Commentators apparently agree that these and other attempts to
equalize the effects of commercial treaties as between states with
6. Compare Havana Charter arts. 29, 31, with Rome Treaty arts. 37, 90.
7. The official text of the general agreement is contained in CoNTRA No P, AEs
To THE GENERAL AGRE MENT ON TARnws AND TRADE, 3 BASIC INsThuMENTs AND
SELECE Documsrrs (1958) [hereinafter cited as GATT]. All references to the
provisions of the agreement are taken from this text.
8. GATT art. II, para. 4.
9. Compare GATT art. II, para. 4 (as amended by Annex I ad art. II, para. 4), with
art. XVII, para. 4 (b) (as amended by Annex I ad art. XVII, para. 4).
10. GATT, Annex I ad arts. XI-XIV, XVIII: "Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV and XVII the terms 'import restrictions' or 'export restrictions' include restrictions
made effective through state-trading operations."
11. GATT art. I.
12. GATT art. XII.
13. GATT art. XVII, para. 1.
14. GATT art. XVII, para. 3.
15. GATT art. XVII, para. 4 (c).
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and without state trading have proved rather ineffective. 16 An initial
comparison of article 37 with the regulation of state trading mo-
nopolies in GATT shows significant differences. Article 37 provides
not rules of conduct, but an adjustment of state trading monopolies
"so as to ensure that, when the transitional period expires, no discrimi-
nation exists between the nationals of Member States as regards the
supply or marketing of goods."17 Contrary to the anti-discrimination
provision of GATT, article 7 prohibits not only discrimination as be-
tween foreigners, but rather all discriminations on the grounds of
nationality. The general prohibition of article 7 applies without
prejudice to more particular provisions such as article 37. The scope
of article 37 goes beyond discrimination on the grounds of nationality
since all discrimination is to be eliminated "between the nationals
of Member States as regards the supply or marketing of goods." 18
Furthermore, discrimination may be found irrespective of any arbitrary
or wilful conduct, for those market conditions are decisive which
may lead to the discrimination specified. Article 37 views state trad-
ing monopolies as instruments of quantitative restrictions, to be ad-
justed by the termination of the transitional period and thereafter
subject to the general rules of the Treaty, particularly to the rules
of competition. Thus is the crucial question posed: Do there exist
characteristics of state trading monopolies, which by their very nature
prove to be discriminatory, and must, therefore, be "adjusted"? If so,
the exclusive right of import or export will be incompatible with the
Treaty.
2. State Trading and the System of Undistorted Competition.-
The interdependence of the customs union and the system of un-
distorted competition within the Community has come to be taken
for granted. But it is in this respect that the Community is the most
progressive, even revolutionary, system of regulating and preserving
competition in international trade. The more ambitious the policy
of maintaining competition, the more crucial the position of public
enterprise becomes. Conversely, as long as international cartels and
similar arrangements were envisioned as instruments of market organi-
zation by the governments concerned, the tasks and functions of
16. HuTH, DIE SONDERSTELLUNG DER OFFENTLICHEN HAND IN DEN EuroPAIScHEN
GEmENSCIAFTEX 202-05 (1965); Smn MuHAmzvrp, THE LEGAL FRAmwonn oF
WORLD TRADE 231 (1958); Fawcett, State Trading and International Organization,
24 LA-w & CoNTEMP. PnoB. 341, 344 (1959).
17. The text of the Treaty in all four authentic languages allows of no doubts in
this respect; e.g., the French text: "... soit assur6 l'exclusion de toute discrimina-
tion .... and the German: "... dass jede Diskriminierung ausgeschlossen ist.
The duration of the transitional period is determined by article 8.
18. The relationship of the discrimination prohibitions is discussed in detail in the
text following note 76 infra.
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public enterprises were interpreted accordingly and posed no specific
problems of policy. The contrast between the Treaty of Rome and
earlier projects for a customs union in Europe reveals the economic
and legal significance of the establishment of a system of undistorted
competition.
(a.) A Note of History.-In 1927, when the League of Nations
held a World Economic Conference to deal with the difficulties arising
out of the economic and political disunion in Europe, the lowering
of tariffs and the functioning, promotion, and control of international
cartels were foremost on the agenda.19 National cartel regulation
was unanimously accepted as the basis of control.20 The possibility
of international control, based upon international jurisdiction and
enforced by delegations representing governments which for the mo-
ment renounced their rights, was considered to be so extreme that
"no sensible men at this conference or anywhere else" would agree
to such a suggestion.21 It will be difficult to find a comparable
case of inadvertent prophecy in forecasting the rules of competition
of the Rome Treaty. 2
The World Economic Conference was followed in 1930 by the
"preliminary conference with a view to concerted action."2' This
preliminary conference was concerned with negotiations for a tariffs
truce to improve the economic relations of the states concerned
and to contribute toward the economic union of Europe, the addresses
by Briand and Stresemann in the Assembly of the League of Nations
in 1929 having inspired the idea of a "United States of Europe"
in the context of economic integration.24 The aim of the negotia-
tions planned by the preliminary conference was twofold: (1) to se-
cure concerted action with a view to closer cooperation, the im-
provement of the regime of production and trade, and the enlarge-
ment of markets, and (2) to facilitate the relations of the European
markets among themselves and with overseas markets, so as to consoli-
19. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT, Proceedings of the World Economic Conference,
held at Geneva, May 4, 1927, vol. 2, Doc. No. C.356.M.129-1927.II, at 125-70 (1927).
20. The reporter of the pertinent committee stated:
First and foremost-and it cannot be repeated too often-these international cartels
must come under the jurisdiction of the court of the state in whose territory they
are operating, whether this happens to be in their own country or elsewhere,
and even when they have contracts with nationals of other countries. Hence
they are subject to drastic supervision, being subordinate to the judicial authorities
and the law. Id. vol. 1, at 152.
21. Ibid.
22. For a summary of the position at the Conference in respect of international cartels
see LrEAUE oF NATIONS, THE WORLD EcoNoric CONF cEc, Geneva, May 1927,
FnArL REPORT, Doc. No. C.E. 1.43, at 41, 43-44 (1927).
23. LEAGUE oF NATIONs, Doc. No. C.222. M. 109 (1930).
24. As to the political background, see generally ALBONETTY, VoaGEsccrIcrT DEim
VMIEnGTEN STAATEN VON EURoPA (1961).
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date economic peace among nations.2 -The participating states sub-'
mitted proposals in furtherance of these aims,2 containing among
other suggestions the reduction of tariffs, the establishment of a
customs union, and the regulation of markets by international cartels.
In particular, the Belgian Government proposed the distribution and
localization of the production and trade by international cartels for
such mass products as crude and simply rolled metals, plate glass
and cement.2 7 The German Government, wishing to enlarge markets
by reducing tariffs and establishing customs unions, suggested that
"[a]part... from official measures, agreements between industries or
agricultural associations'in various countries might also help to widen
the markets and to improve international trade."m
The French delegation developed these ideas into a comprehensive
proposal submitted to the "Commission of Inquiry for European
Union" which was held under the auspices, of the League of Nations.29
One of the causes of the depression was said to be disturbance of
the equilibrium between the production of raw materials and the
production of manufactured articles-a disturbance caused in turn
by over-rapid technological progress and an over-accentuated rhythm
of rationalization during the preceding few years. Harmony between
the main centers and elements of production was said to have been
lacking, and the defective market allocation was attributed to the
use of machinery ill-adapted to secure optimal product distribution.
The proposed remedy was to correct the operation of the machinery
of production and distribution and to impose greater discipline in
the matter of production and sales; this to be achieved by agreements
and cartels in conjunction with a customs union.30 These agreements
and cartels were to be concluded under the auspices of the participat-
ing governments on the basis of plans-initiated by the various industrial
interests. In this way, it was thought possible to reduce tariffs in
25. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, op. cit. supra note 23, at-35,
26. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
vITI-I A VIEv TO CONCERTED ECONOMIc ACTION, Geneva, Nov. 17-28, 1930, ,Dec. No.
C.149.M.48. 1931, I. B. Fourth Part, Annexes.
27. Id. at 127-28.
28. Id. at 120.
29. LEAGUE OF NATIONS,, CONMSSION OF ENQUIRY FOR EUROPEAN UNION, MINTrES
oF THE Tma SESSION OF THE CoiMMSSiO N, held at Geneva, May 15-21, 1931, Doc.
No. C.395.M.158. 1931, VII; at 20 (1931); PRoposALs FOR REmEDYING TnE PREsENT
EUROPEAN Caisis, MENoPA Nnu FROm ilm FRENCH GOVERNMENT, LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
op. cit. supra, Annex at 79-88.
30. The French Government proposed that, since a general action to bring about the
immediate and simultaneous lowering of customs duties had not succeeded, the economic
life of the nations, each material and product dealt with in turn, should be orgaxiized at
an accelerated rate, by developing 'the system of combines and cartels, regardless of
political frontiers, in the certainty that in this way and in no other way customs-barriers
will gradually be eliminated smoothly and without disttirbance. Id. at 85-.
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any way interfering with the interests of producers and consumers
and without disturbing the individual national economies.
These proposals illustrate how the reduction of tariffs and the
protection of national markets may be simultaneously propounded.
Their economic foundation is to be found in the attempt to combine
the trade-diverting effects of a customs union with the exclusion
of that competition within the union created by the abolition of
tariffs.31 The protection of the home industries was to be thereby
strengthened and the terms of trade vis-a'-vis third countries im-
proved without at the same time allowing competition to develop.
The status quo was to be secured by territorial allocation of markets
on the basis of nationality, while quotas and prices were to be agreed
upon with respect to joint markets. Agreements to specialize pro-
duction appeared as a dynamic achievement and as the only rational
way of organizing markets.
It would probably be too optimistic to assume that in Europe to-
day these ideas have been relegated to the past. But that the Rome
Treaty does in fact so relegate them ought to be manifestly clear.
(b.) The Rules of the Rome Treaty in Perspective.-The Rome
Treaty aims to secure all possibilities of free trade arising from the
abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. It is for this purpose
that all measures having the equivalent effects of customs duties or
quantitative restrictions are meticulously proscribed (article 9, para-
graphs 1 and 30), as are the introduction of new customs duties,
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effects (ar-
ticles 12 and 31).
The unconditional obligation of the member states to refrain from
interfering with the free movement of goods gives rise to equivalent
individual rights to make use of these possibilities of trade between
member states.32 The customs union cannot be looked upon merely
as a device to facilitate negotiations with respect to the acceptable
degree of trade among the member states or as an instrument to avoid
the technical and political defects involved in negotiating tariff con-
cessions. Rather, the functioning of the common market consists
in the exercise by the individual enterprises of that right of free trade
which is concomitant with the abolition of customs duties. Moreover,
this potential competition is protected as a matter of law, for the
Treaty implements the principle of free entry to the national markets
by rules of competition which regulate the behavior of enterprises
31. See Vnm, THE CUSTOMS UNIoN IssuE 75 (1950).
32. Rechtssache 26/62. N.V. Allgemene Transport- en Expedite Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Niederhindische Finanzverwaltung, IX Sammlung 1 (1963), 2 CCH
Com. Mrr. REP. ff 8008 (1963).
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within a system of undistorted competition. And as clearly articu-
lated by article 90 paragraph 1, these same principles are binding upon
the member states in their capacity as entreprenuers. The direct
relation of these rules of competition to the customs union highlights
the transition from a customs union to an economic union-from the
abolition of trade barriers to the development of the Common Market
as an institution.
Article 90 paragraph 1, it should be noted, is not necessary to
subject public enterprises to the rules of competition. Commentators
agree that the term "enterprise" in articles 85 and 86 includes
enterprises of all kinds (public as well as private) and that state
agencies and state-owned-or-controlled enterprises are within its
ambit. Article 90 paragraph 1 is more significantly directed towards
the member states, proscribing measures which as such would not be
covered by the rules of competition.3 The specific reference to
article 7 and articles 85 to 94 underlines the fact that the market
effects of state measures are brought about by the conduct of enter-
prises. The highly important, special function of article 90 paragraph
1 is to prevent the member states from' interfering with competition
by exercising their special prerogatives vis-a'-vis public enterprises,
thus acting contrary to the spirit of the rules of competition without,
however, violating the letter of the Treaty.4
A comparison with CAT]? and the Havana Charter indicates the
extent to which article 90 extends the previous rules governing public
enterprises. Although the Havana Charter provided in chapter V
for measures against restrictive practices engaged in or effected by
"Public commercial enterprises,"3 the measures were to apply only
upon a declaration by the member state that it assumed responsibility
for the enterprises. 36 Article 90, like all other provisions of the
Rome Treaty, applies irrespective of either a national initiative or
the position an enterprise may hold under national law. Thus, an
enterprise may come within the scope of article 90 even though it is
not considered a public enterprise under the law of the respective
member state. Similarly, although article 90 paragraph 1 reflects the
language of GATT (which speaks of enterprises to which a member
state "grants . . . formally or in effect, exclusive or special privi-
33. See MESTM ACXm, Offene Markete im System unverfalschten Wettbewerbs, in
WIRTSCILAFTSORDNUNG J ND REcHTSOIDUNuNG, FESTSCHBIFT rUm FRANZ BoEm 345, 384
(1965).
34. REGIRUNGSAJSSCHUSS, ENGESEIZT VON DER KONFERENZ VON MESSINA, BERiCHT
IER DELEGATIONSLETTrM AN DIE AussMrNISmn, April 4, 1956, at 61 [hereinafter
cited as SPAx REPORT].
35. Havana Charter art. 46, para. 2 (b).
36. Havana Charter art. 54, para. 2 (b) (ii).
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leges .... ,),37 in substance, the commercial considerations clause 38
of GATT cannot be compared with article 90. GATT, of course, con-
tains no rules against restrictive business practices, and a substantially
less comprehensive principle of non-discrimination than that incorpo-'
rated into article 90 by reference to article 7.
1 The Spaak Report, in outlining the characteristics of the future
Common Market, referred to what was ultimately to become article
90 paragraph 1 in terms of discrimination: "The most flagrant discrimi-
nations by sellers ari caused, or assisted in, by states. The applica-
tion of, the rules of competition to enterprises will, therefore, be
simplified ox, even will be displaced by rules of competition by the
member states." 9 It is highly significant that, as early as in this
report, the elimination of discrimination by state enterprises was
assumed to be the function of the rules of competition.
Article 90 paragraph 2 contains an exemptive provision for enter-
prises "entrusted with the management of services of general eco-
nomic interest or having the character of a fiscal monopoly." These
enterprises are ipso jure exempted from the Treaty as a whole, in-
cluding the rules of competition, but only insofar as the fulfillment
of the specific tasks entrusted to them would be obstructed by the
application of these rules. This exemption does not automatically
apply to the enterprises referred to in article 90 paragraph 1. More-
over, article 90 paragraph 2, contrary to article 90 paragraph 1, is
directed toward. the enterprises as such, rather than toward the
member states. Insofar as the exemption operates, however, it
obviously exempts the member states from otherwise proscribed
measures taken with respect to such enterprises.
I. STATE TRADING MONOPOLIES UNDER ARTICLE 37
A. The Policy of the Commission During the Transitional Period
1. Survey of State Trading Monopolies in the EEC.-In compliance
with a request of the Commission, the member states gave notification
of the products they considered to be subject to a state trading
monopoly within the meaning of article 37.40 The organization, scope,
37. GATT art. XVII, para. 1 (a).
38. GATT art. XVII, para. 1 (b).
39. S,'AAx REPoRT 14 (author's transl.).
40. The Commission has reported on the notified monopolies, see 3 GESArrFA1IUCHIT
UBEr Dm. TATxIKElT DER GErEINscHIFr 95 (No. 105 (1960)) (hereinafter cited as
GEsAwTmTnXCnT1; 7 GEsAmmucnhIcT 39 (No. 21) (1964); Response to the Commission
to Inquiry No. 51 in the European Parliament, July 24, 1964, ArrsnLATr DEn
EuRorascm GEmmNSCHAYTEN 390 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Response to Inquiry
No. 51]. There are the following state trading monopolies in the member states: France:
tobacco, matches, potash, newsprint, explosives, alcohol, mineral oil; Germany: matches,
alcohol; Italy: tobacco, cigarette paper, matches, phosphor, firelighters and flints, salt,
sulfur, quinine, saccharine, bananas. -
[ VOL. 20
STATE TRADING IN THE E.E.C.
activities, and functions of these monopolies are vastly different.
They may cover production, marketing, export and import of the
monopolized goods. They may monopolize the distributive organi-
zation, or they may sell to all comers. The purposes are as manifold
as the aims of state interventions: national autonomy, because of the
strategic importance of the goods; protection of native producers;
state revenues; the provision for veterans, as in the case of the
French tobacco monopoly.
The monopolies may be organized as branches of the government,
as public corporations, or as private corporations subject to a regime
that in effect creates a state monopoly. The latter case gives rise
to the question whether article 37 paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
requires a certain kind of organization besides the monopolizing of
a market.41 The scope of the monopoly is relevant under article 37
only insofar as it appreciably influences, directly or indirectly, im-
ports or exports between member states. The monopolization of
production as such is not covered, although it will probably influence
the monopoly's buying or selling policy as well.
2. The Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.-Quantitative re-
strictions in general are to be abolished gradually (articles 30 to 36);
article 33 specifies the conditions and the timetable to be observed.
State trading monopolies are to be adjusted in harmony with the
timetable applicable to the abolition of quantitative restrictions on
the same products (article 37 paragraph 3). Consequently, in some
cases the member states established global quotas (article 33 para-
graph 1) for the import of monopolized goods as a first step in the
direction of an adjustment.4 Italy abolished all quantitative restric-
tions for the import of tobacco.4 Germany has undertaken to abolish
gradually certain quantitative restrictions for -spirits and to intro-
duce a system whereby import licenses will be granted automatically."
Italy substituted for her banana monopoly an import regulation- aim-
ing at a complete liberalization of trade.45 The effects of these
measures on the importation of monopolized goods have varied con-
siderably. As was to be expected, the increase of global quotas-or
even their abolishment-did not always lead to proportional increases
in the importation of such goods, for as long. as the importation de-
41. See text accompanying and following notes 64-66 infra.
42. E.g., the Italian salt monopoly, 7 GEsA1'tmTarcnT 42 (No. 27) (1964); 5
GmF~s~vrmucHT 47 (No. 17) (1962); the Italian cigarette paper monopoly, 5
GmAscrnmucrr 47 (No. 17) (1962).
43. Europiiische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Kommission, Die 1. Stufe des Gemeinsamen
Marktes, Bericht fiber die Durcbfiihrung des Vertages (Jan. 1958 to Jan. 1962) 26.
44. 8 GEsA~mTmurrcm46 (No. 30) (1965).
45. 9 GFsAmrmrmucm-r 50 (No. 34) (1966).
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pends upon the discretion of the monopoly, the abolition of quanti-
tative restrictions may be but a token measure of compliance.
3. The Recommendations of the Commisison Under Article 37
Paragraph 6.-The Treaty directs the Commission to make "recom-
mendations as to the manner of effecting the adjustment provided
for in . . . [article 37] and the timetable which shall govern it"
(article 37 paragraph 6). As recommendations of the Commission
have no binding force (article 189), the member states are free to
effect the requisite adjustment in ways other than those recommended.
However, the position of the Commisison has considerable weight
with respect to the interpretation of article 37; and, although the
recommendations as such are not binding, the rules of article 37 are
definitely binding. The recommendations thus serve to facilitate
compliance by the member states and to assure a balanced adjust-
ment with similar effects in all member states concerned.
In compliance with the mandate of article 37, the Commission
issued recommendations to the member states with respect to the
adjustment of their monopolies.46 In these recommendations the Com-
mission pointed out that article 37 paragraph 1 dictates the purpose
of the adjustment without regulating the methods by which it is to
be achieved. However, as long as the monopolies were the sole im-
porters of the monopolized goods, it was necessary, according to the
Commission, to eliminate at least the following kinds of discrimi-
nations: 47 (a) discriminations flowing from a restriction of imports,
as compared with the potential sales on the market in the member
states' territory (the potential sales to be ascertained by taking into
account the elimination of the following discriminations as well);
(b) discriminations created by the application of different mark-ups
between delivered prices and sales prices to imported products on
the one side and domestic products on the other side, whereby a
46. Recommendation to the Italian Government, Feb. 2, 1962 (bananas), AMTSBLATr
342 (1962): recommendation to the French Government, April 6, 1962 (tobacco),
AMTsBLrTr 1500 (1962); recommendation to the French Government, April 11, 1962
(matches), AmsiLArr 1502 (1962); recommendation to the Italian Government,
April 11, 1962 (matches), AmTSBLATT 1505 (1962); recommendation to the French
Government, April 12, 1962 (potash), AMsBLATr 1506 (1962); recommendations to
the Italian Government, July 4, 1963 (bananas), A~rrsn.ATT 2150 (1963); recom-
mendation to the French Government, July 24, 1963 (mineral oil), AMrSBLATr 2271
(1963); recommendation to the German Government, Nov. 26, 1963 (alcohol),
AM&TSBLATT 2857 (1963); recommendation to the French Government, Nov. 26, 1963
(alcohol), AMrsBLAT 2858 (1963). The recommendations to the Italian Government
of March 28, 1960 (tobacco) and that to the French Government of April 12, 1962
(crude oil) have not been published. See Response to Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40.
47. See recommendations of April 6, 1962 (French tobacco), April 11, 1962
(French matches), April 11, 1962 (Italian matches), April 12, 1962 (French potash),
as cited supra note 46. To the same effect, 5 GESAmurBmuuCT 48 (No. 18) (1962); 6
GEsAnmucrr 44 (No. 17) (1963).
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higher charge is allocated to the imported goods; and (c) discrimi-
nations in the distribution of imported goods, particularly in selling
to retailers, in opening up new markets, and in advertising. The
effects of these recommendations on the conduct and the organiza-
tion of the monopolies, particularly on the importation of the goods
concerned, and on the competitive position of third country sellers
are not readily apparent. This is true as to the immediate effects as
well as to the adjustments of the monopolies to a free market.
The Commission itself did not decide whether compliance with its
recommendations would be sufficient to fulfill the obligations under
article 37 paragraph 1, but rather adopted the position that only
experience would show whether the recommended measures were
satisfactory:
If the realization of the principles outlined does not effect a true liberaliza-
tion of the trade in monopolized goods which is comparable with that
liberalization which follows from the elimination of tariffs and quantitative
restrictions for all other goods, then the preservation of the exclusive rights
of these monopolies to import the monopolized goods would be contrary
to the aims of article 37, contrary to the principle of reciprocity in opening
up national markets, and contrary to the universality of the Common
Market, which according to article 9 paragraph 2 shall apply to all
products.48
Thus, the Commission points to what was previously denominated
the most important single issue under article 37 paragraph 1: whether
the maintenance of the exclusive right to import the monopolized
goods is compatible with the mandate to eliminate the possibilities
of all discrimination at the end of the transitional period. In relying
on future experience, the Commission avoids answering this ques-
tion as a matter of law.
In response to an inquiry in the European Parliament in 1965,49
the Commission reported that the member states had agreed "in
principle" with its recommendations and were taking measures in
accordance therewith to adjust their monopolies. However, the
French Government has introduced a pricing system for tobacco
which is different from that proffered by the Commission. And
there are negotiations with respect to the recommendations con-
cerning the French matches monopoly and the Italian alcohol mo-
nopoly.
There remain important issues under article 37, the relevance of
which extends beyond the expiration of the transitional period. They
concern the nature of the organization covered by article 37 para-
graph 1, subparagraph 2 (under section B infra p. 334), the meaning of
48. Ibid. (author's transl.).
49. Response to Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40.
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the prescribed "adjustment" of the monopolies under article 37 para-
graph 1 (under section C infra p. 338), the meaning of the "stand-still"
clause of article 37 paragraph 2 (under section D infra p. 344), and
the relation of article 37 to other provisions of the Treaty (under
section E infra p. 346).
B. Which Organizations Are Covered by Article 37 Paragraph 1?
1. Opinions of the Court of Justice.-The paramount importance of
determining which organizations constitute state trading monopolies
or similar organizations within the meaning of article 37 paragraph 1
became fully apparent in connection with the administrative, judicial,
and scholarly controversy surrounding the French petroleum system.
The underlying reason for this controversy is obvious: compliance
with article 37 appears to be more advantageous to the member
states than compliance with the general provisions of the Treaty, if
article 37 is considered a special provision taking precedence over
all others.50
Articles 30 to 36 decree an automatic liberalization of quantitative
restrictions while article 37 provides for a gradual adjustment of
monopolies only, leaving the details to the discretion of the member
states. Under articles 30 to 36, all quantitative restrictions are to be
abolished at the end of the transitional period, while under article 37
only discriminations must be eliminated. If article 37 should permit
the maintenance of an exclusive right of importation, such an arrange-
ment would leave considerably more leeway to the member states than
do the quantitative restriction provisions. Moreover, if article 37 is also
considered a special provision with respect to the rules of competition,
that would provide the member states with an additional incentive to
broaden its scope, as the rules of competition are applicable in ful
without any period of grace. The delineation of article 37, therefore,
has implications far beyond the adjustment of those monopolies
which are presently notified with the Commission.51
The Court of Justice barely touched upon the problem in the Costa
case.52 There the court settled a preliminary issue with respect to the
nationalization 53 by the Italian Government of the production and
50. To this effect see Van Hecke, Government Enterprises and National Monopolies
under the E.E.C. Treaty, 3 CommoN Msr. L. REv. 450, 454 (1966).
51. The Commission has already announced that it is investigating other branches of
industry in order to ascertain their standing under art. 37. Response to Inquiry No. 51,
supra note 40.
52. Rechtssache 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa
git della Edison Volta), X Sammlung 1254 (1964); 2 CCH CoM. Mi-r. RuEP. fr 8023
(1964) (with Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange of June 25, 1964).
53. Law of Dec. 6, 1962, No. 1643, Gaz.uff. No. 316, Dec. 12, 1962, Leggi e
decreti 1962, No. 1643, at 5523, and subsequent decrees.
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distribution of electrical energy by rejecting (in accordance with the
conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange)4 the view of the Italian
Government that article 37 was inapplicable because the production
and supply of electrical energy constituted a public service.m" The
prerequisites of a state trading monopoly within the meaning of
article 37 were referred to in the following terms:
This article prohibits the introduction not of all state monopolies but of
'trading' monopolies, in so far as they tend to introduce the above-men-
tioned . . . [article 37 paragraph 1] discriminations. In order to come
within the prohibition of this provision, the State monopolies and the
organizations in question, must on the one hand, have as their purpose
transactions in a commercial product that is likely to be the object of
competition and of trade between the Member States and, on the other
hand, play an active part in such trade.5
More controversial were the issues growing out of the French
petroleum system with which the Court was faced in the Sopeco
case.57 The French petroleum system is basically a system of govern-
mental market regulation resulting from the statutory enactmentM
of a comprehensive cartel arrangement previously created by French
producers of petroleum and petroleum derivatives. Under the present
system, these products may be imported into France only by firms
authorized by special decree, which decrees fix sales quotas with
respect to the products derived from the imported petroleum. There
are no quotas for the sale of products derived from French crude
oil (including oil from the Sahara region). Since the eight authorized
importers of crude oil must obtain at least 90 per cent of their total
sales from French refineries, the authorized importers, being' the
major refiners themselves, are obliged to refine the imported products
in their own refineries or affiliated refineries. Thus, the control of im-
ports is integrated into the general allocation of the French market.
54. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 52, at 1300-03, 2 CCH
Com. Micr. REP. at 7402-03 (1964).
55. The concept of "service publique" is known in Belgian, French and Italian
law. The applicability of the concept and the substance of the special objectives
are different in the three. countries. The concept is known to neither the law of
Germany nor that of the Netherlands. This was pointed out by Advocate General
Lagrange, supra note 52, in arguing against the concept's incorporation into Com-
munity law. It is for the same reason that art. 90 para. 2 referring to "afiy concern
entrusted with services of general economic interest" is a concept of Community law
and must be interpreted as such.-
56. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 52, at, 1276, 2 CCH
Com. MKir. REP,. at 7393- (1964).
57. Rechtssache 20/64, S.A.R.L. Albatros -v. SOPECO (Soci6t6 des P6troles et des
Combustibles liquides), XI-3, Sammlung (1965); 2 CCH Com. M-r. REP. II 8029
(1965) (with Conclusions of Advocate General Gand of Dec. 2,_1964).
58. Law of March 30, 1928 (as amended by numerous decrees and ordinances):.
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The importation of derivatives, which was involved in the Sopeco case,
is subject to authorization by decree as well. Again, the authorized
importers are generally the companies which are simultaneously
engaged in the distribution of French competitive products. More-
over, the French petroleum system is not limited to import restrictions.
All operations from the refining level to the different uses of deriva-
tives and to the retail level are subject to close governmental super-
vision and regulation.
Albatros, an Italian firm, had agreed on March 9, 1959, to supply
Sopeco, the French firm, with 6000 metric tons of gasoline. In April
of 1959, Sopeco informed Albatros that the French authorities had
refused an import license. When sued for breach of contract in an
Italian court, the defendant claimed that the refusal of the French
authorities to authorize the importation was force majeure and relieved
it of its contractual obligations. On the request of the parties, the
Italian court referred the case to the Court of Justice asking for a
preliminary ruling in accordance with article 177.
The Court did not rule on the validity of the French law per se for
that is not its function under article 177. Rather it "sifted out" from
among the questions actually certified to it by the Italian court those
properly addressed to Treaty interpretation. The Court interpreted
the "sifted oue' questions extremely narrowly, finding no reason to
examine whether the French system constituted a monopoly within
the meaning of article 37. This the Court was able to do by restricting
its ruling to the question whether, at the time the contract was made,
the Treaty called for the abolition ipso jure of those laws referred to
in any of the provisions of the chapter concerning quantitative
restrictions. Finding that all of the provisions on quantitative restric-
tions, including article 37, called for a gradual abolition of restrictions,
that question obviously had to be answered in the negative. On the
basis of the finding, the Court was able to defer a ruling on the
relation of article 37 to other provisions of the Treaty. In effect, the
case leaves almost everything undecided.
However, both the Commission and Advocate General Gand
found it apposite to examine whether the French petroleum system
was a state trading monopoly, and advised the Court that their answer
was positive. The Commission relied upon its opinion in the recom-
mendation to the French Government to adjust the petroleum system. 9
Advocate General Gand referred to this opinion of the Commission
and to the history of article 37: "In spite of the small amount of
information available.., it appears impossible to deny the fact that
the French system was considered at the time as belonging within the
59. ArsBnLA-r 2271 (1963).
[ VOL, 20
STATE TRADING IN THE E.E.C.
framework of article 37."60 He further indicated that he thought the
system of imports could not be described as a state monopoly either
retained by the state or delegated, but that it constituted "one of the
types of import controls that are referred to in Article 37 paragraph
(1) ... [subparagraph 2] of the Treaty."6'
2. The Outlines of a Definition.-The French Conseil d'Etat in an
earlier case 62 found the French petroleum system so clearly within
the ambit of article 37 that it did not deem it necessary to refer the
issue to the Court of Justice under article 177, although it decided as a
"domestic court of a Member State, from whose decisions there is
no possibility of appeal under domestic law," and was therefore bound
to refer questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaty to the
Court of Justice.
It will be difficult to find an administrative or judicial decision,
proclaimed to be so clear as to be unquestionable, which has a
rationale less clear than that of this case. 3 While it would be
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the French petroleum
system as such, the case serves to illustrate with abundant clarity the
importance of the alternative interpretations of article 37. Those legal
writers who favor the application of article 37 to the French petroleum
system generally stress the monopolistic influence of a member state
on imports or exports as the decisive criterion in finding an organiza-
tion under article 37 paragraph 1.6 Contrary to the prevailing opinion,
Wiirdinger expressly denies that article 37 paragraph 1, subparagraph
2 defines state trading monopolies.6 But article 37 speaks of an
60. Conclusions of Advocate General Gand, supra note 57, at 22, 2 CCH Com.
Mr. REP. at 7448 (1965).
61. Ibid.
62. Soci6t6 des p6troles Shell-Berre, Conseil d'Etat, June 19, 1964, REvuE DU Dnorr
purc 1034 (1964); see also 2 CommoN MKr. L. REV. 221 (1964). A review of the
criticism of this case by French legal writers is given by Chevalier, 3 CommroN Mr.
L. REv. 100 (1965).
63. See the excellent article by Colliard, L'obscure clartM de l'article 37 du TraitM
de Communaut 6conomique europ~enne, REcurt DALLOZ (CHRoNiQuEs) 263 (1964).
64. See CATALANO, MANUEL DE DRorr DES COMxEUNA~uTES EUROPENES 340 (1965);
Schilling, Der Vertrag zur Griindung dee" Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und
die staalichen Handesmonopole, in SocrALrcoNoMiscrm W-TGEViNG EuRoPA 241
(1960); Wiirdinger, Probleme de Auslegung des Artikel 37 EWG-Vertrag betreffend die
Handelsmonopole, dargelegt an dem Beispiel de franzisischen Mineraltlwirtschaft, 15
WmvscaArr mU WE-rnnvmm 265 (1965); Huth, Staatliche Handelsmonopole und
EWC-Vertrag, W Ewm w iN Rzcirr uND PRAxis 428 (1965). Huth stresses the
functional unity of a number of restrictive measures characteristic of art. 37 para. 1 (2)
which he wishes to differentiate from the monopolies proper. He assumes for the former
organization only that they are to be eliminated as such at the end of the transitional
period.
65. Compare Wiirdinger, supra note 64, with conclusions of Advocate General La-
grange, supra note 52, at 1301, 2 CCH CoM. MxT. REP, at 7402; ESTNMa in vON DEm
GRoEBEN & VON BoEcm, KOMMENTAn zuinm EWG-VaaA. 104 (Art. 37 Anm, 6d)
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"organisation through which a member state, de jure or de facto, either
directly or indirectly controls, supervises or appreciably influences
imports or exports by Member States." This wording leaves no doubt
that an organisme or Einrichtung (the instrument through which
imports or exports are controlled) is required. Colliard is correct
in stressing this organic element of article 37 in addition to the
functional element of controlling the export and import trade.6 This
interpretation finds decisive support in the raison d'etre of article 37.
Because commercial considerations and considerations of national
policy are inseparably interwoven in the case of a state monopoly
proper, application of the general rules on quantitative restrictions is
insufficient. Only insofar as a comparable situation exists because of
an "organisation through which a Member State" controls imports and
exports, is there a justification for applying article 37. This provision
not only allows, it demands such an interpretation.
C. The "Adjustment" of State Trading Monopolies
1. The Purpose and the Effect of the Adjustment.-The purpose of
article 37 paragraph 1 is the elimination of every discrimination
"between the nationals of Member States as regards the supply or
marketing of goods." The monopolies are to be adjusted by the
end of the transitional period. The Court of Justice, faced in
the Costa case primarily with the interpretation of the "stand-still"
clause of article 37 paragraph 2, was, of necessity, likewise con-
fronted with the scope of the prohibition of discrimination in article
37 paragraph 1. But in referring the question whether there had been
a discrimination back to the national judge, the Court was content to
repeat the Words of the Treaty. A member of the Court recently
suggested that the Court might appropriately reconsider its position
because it "leaves too much to the decision of the national judge." 7
As has been noted previously, the Commission has also reserved its
final position as to the mandate of article 37 paragraph 1. However,
the issue under article 37 paragraph 1 of whether state trading
(1958); GLAsNEz in Wo=ArmT, EvEaR.IN, GLAESNER & SPRUNG, Dim EUnOPmAscuu
WmTSCHAFrSGEmmwSCHAFT 101-02 (Art. 37 Anna. 2) (1960); Schilling, Der Vertrag
zur Griindung der EWG und die staatlichen Handesmonopole, DER BanmEn 697
(1961).
66. Colliard, supra note 63, at 266-67. Accord, Chevalier, supra note 62, at 102-03,
Van Hecke observes that the French word "organisme" and the German word
"Einrichtung" are perhaps clearer than the English word "organisation" in pointing
to an entity as opposed to a method. Van Hecke, supra note 50, at 458.
67. Strauss, Zalle und mengenmdssige Beschridnkungen in der Rechtsprechung des
Gerichtshofs der Europdischen Gemeinschdften zum Rechte der Europischtcn Wirts-
chaftsgemeinschaft, in PROBLZE DES mEoPAiSCHaEN REcus, FEsTscHiFT rum WALTEmI
HALisEI 515, 532 (1966).
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monopolies are by their very nature discriminatory remains. An
affirmative finding would obligate each member state to abolish its
monopolies vis-a'-vis the other member states.. A negative finding
would lead to rules of conduct, which ensure the gradual elimination of
discrimination.
A literal interpretation of the term "adjust" fails to resolve the
controversy. To "adjust" in the four equally authentic treaty languages
simply refers to a change with respect to a given purpose.68 But if
a literal interpretation of article 37 paragraph 1 does not proscribe
state trading monopolies by the end of the transitional period, neither
does it guarantee their continued existence with respect to intra-
Community trade. The use of the term "State trading monopolies"
designates the organization which is subjected to an adjustment
without indicating the character which that organization will have
subsequent to the adjustment. The reference to import monopolies in
the Spaak Report, though posing the problem succinctly, contributes
little to the interpretation of article 37.69 Historically, the drafting
appears to reflect a compromise purposely avoiding resolution of the
controversy.
2. The Discriminations Proscribed.-(a.) Different Concepts of
Discrimination.-In determining the nature of the adjustment, certain
legal writers engage in an ingenious, but ultimately misleading,
linguistic analysis. They find in the concept of discrimination three
requisite participants-a trinity consisting of the discriminating mem-
ber state and at least two member state nationals, one of whom is
discriminated against.70 In arguing on the basis of a supposedly self-
evident concept of discrimination, however, questions of substance
have in fact been answered.
A state trading monopoly is characterized by the identity of the
68. See Colliard, supra note 63, at 264; HurH, DiE SoNNDERsT=m ZNG DER oFFE-
ucmm HAm nT xaN EunoPAxscmN GmvfNscHApI= 271 (1965).
69. The pertinent part of the report reads:
A special problem is posed if imports are controlled directly, not by quanti-
tative restrictions, but through the establishment of state import monopolies or
through private import monopolies licensed by the state.
In this case the institution that restricts imports is identical with the buyer.
An automatic increase of quotas is not feasible because this would lead to
forced buying.
In finding a solution it is important that after the expiration of the transi-
tional period state organizations for buying or importing are either abolished
or adjusted to the Common Market, or, if necessary, are merged into a
common organization . . . . The European Commission has to submit pro-
posals for this development of the exchange of products and for the ad-
justment of the existing organizations, in order to gradually. eliminate a
discrimination among the sellers in the Common Market. SPAAK REPORT at 41, 42.
(author's transl.).
70. See Humr, op. cit. supra note 68, at 272; Huth, supra note 64, at 428.
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member state as sovereign and as trader. Consequently, in selecting a
buying or selling policy with respect to the monopolized goods, the
member state is in a position to pursue both commercial purposes
and, without benefit of specific legislative or administrative measures,
a policy of controlling interstate trade in the national interest. This
a member state might do, supposedly without running afoul of
article 37, by monopolizing the distribution of its goods impartially,
that is, by excluding domestic buyers as well as nationals of other
member states. Such a concept of discrimination would enable a
member state to define the acceptable degree of discrimination in
interstate trade by restricting domestic trade accordingly. Thus, a
system that restricted imports to selected domestic producers allegedly
would not be discriminatory, since the remaining domestic firms would
be in the same position as firms of other member states.
Even a literal interpretation of article 37 shows that those discrimi-
nations which relate to "the supply or marketing of goods" are covered.
Consequently, discriminations on the basis of the origin of the products
must be covered. But while this appears to be the predominant view
among the commentators,71 agreement in this respect does not preclude
disagreement as to the consequence of the requisite adjustment.
Colliard argues that non-discrimination does not mean wholly free
market entry;
rather it means the possibility of entry under equal conditions. These
conditions are not satisfied, if the licensing may be determined by discre-
tion; but they may be satisfied if this element of discretion be eliminated.
The measure is no longer discriminatory if the procedure assures equal
conditions for all competitors, e.g., a procedure of competitive bidding
supervised by a neutral institution and review by a court of arbitration
being provided for. 72
Such rules of conduct do not include the monopoly itself among the
enterprises to be accorded equal treatment. In effect the requirement
of discrimination-between nationals of member states remains decisive.
. Wiirdinger, however, identifies discrimination on the basis of
product origin with discrimination on the basis of nationality, and
deduces that the mandate of article 37 is to eliminate the exclusive
rights of imports or exports as they relate to trade among the
member states.7 3 Other writers have referred to the incompatibility
--71. GL.AsNEn, op. it. supra note 65, at 102-03 (Art. 37 Ann. 4); SrTNDOnrr, DEn
GLE:xcHErrsSATZ im WmTSCHAFTSREcHT DES GFIEINSAMEN MAnrKrEs, 31 (1965) (Stein-
dorf argues on the basis of art. 37 that the general provision of art. 7 should be
s interpreted as toa cover all internatiofial discriminations including those based
iip6n- the origin of l iodu6ts); Van Hecke, supra note 50, at 460; Colliard, supra note
63; at 269; Wiirdinger,-supri note 64, at 2i7'-'74.
72. Colliard, supra note 63, at 271. (author's transl.).
73. Wfiidinger,.supra note-64, at 273 -
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of the very functions of state trading monopolies with those of the
Common Market,7 4 or to the expectation that supervision of the
monopoly is not likely to lead to the complete elimination of all forms
of national discrimination."
(b.) Discrimination Defined.-It has been suggested that article
37 paragraph 1 be interpreted by taking into account its systematic
context, its function in realizing free trade, and the position of public
enterprise in a system of undistorted competition."6 Article 37 serves
to create conditions in the market of state trading monopolies com-
parable to those in markets where quantitative restrictions have been
removed. Only under these conditions is it feasible that the exchange
of goods may develop free from discrimination among nationals of
the member states.
Initially, the relation of the prohibition of discrimination in article
37 to that of article 7 must be clarified. Article 7 discriminations
consist in the application of aliens' restrictions by the state as
sovereign to the nationals of other member states. In article 37,
however, the state acts as an enterprise. Discriminations directed
against nationals of member states may be effected by maintaining
discriminatory conditions in the market through the exercise of
monopoly power over interstate trade. The state does not create
discriminatory conditions by legislative or administrative measures;
rather, imports or exports of the monopolized goods are determined
on the basis of national interest. The state trading monopoly, how-
ever, is in a position to enter the markets of its competitors freely
and to sell and buy at its discretion. If equal conditions in the supply
or marketing of goods for the nationals of member states are to obtain,
then the competitors of the state trading monopoly must enjoy in the
domestic market the same degree of freedom that is enjoyed by the
monopoly in the market of its competitors.
The text of article 37 paragraph 1 does not simply subject state
trading monopolies to a prohibition of discriminatory conduct in in-
dividual cases, as do article 85 paragraph 1(d) and article 86(c).
Rather, the possibility of every discrimination is to be excluded by
74. SchiUing, supra note 65, at 697.
75. Van Hecke, supra note 50, at 460; Pappalardo in QUADI,- MONACO & TRABUCCM,
1 COMnmNTAUwO CEE 221 (Art. 37 No. 5) (1965) is most 6xplicit on this point,'
stating that it is the possibility of discriminating as such which 'is to be eliminated.
He affirms that this view which might, at a first glance, seem to strengthen art. 37
beyond its text, is fully justified and that if'the completed Adjustnient of the 9tate
trading monopolies permits continuation -of-the proscribed' art. 37 discriminations
beyond the transitional period, the provision would be thereby violated.
76. See generally MEsTmrmcin, op. cit. supra note 33, at 356-63. -
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the prescribed adjugtment.77 Market dominating enterprises may
interfere with the competitive freedom of their customers by dis-
criminating among them; they may, for example, exclude potential
competitors from their markets by vertical restraints of competition or
by inducing their customers to interfere with a competitor's business
by granting discriminatory rebates or price advantages. The prohibi-
tion of such discrimination prevents abuses of market power in
individual cases; its application to state trading monopolies would be
meaningless, however, for they are guaranteed the exclusive distribu-
tion of the monopolized goods by law, and they are protected from
competition by law. The state trading monopoly itself determines,
by its policy of buying and selling, whether and to what extent the
goods of competitors may enter the market. The discrimination
inherent in this structure of monopolies is to be excluded by their
adjustment.
This differentiation of articles 37 and 86 further defines the role
of the former. State trading monopolies are enterprises and would be
subject to the rules of competition, particularly to articles 85, 86, and
90, if article 37 did not grant a temporary exemption. The prohibition
of article 37 would be unnecessary to prohibit discriminatory be-
havior in individual cases because such a prohibition applies by force
of article 90 paragraph 1 and article 86(c) in any case. Furthermore,
article 90 paragraph 3 empowers the Commission to take action against
article 90 violations by directive or decision addressed to the member
states, and this power exists irrespective of the expiration of the
transitional period. It is, therefore, the special function of article 37
to ensure that, at the end of the transitional period, market conditions
prevail that admit of integrating state trading monopolies into the
Common Market by the application of articles 85, 86, and article 90
paragraph 1.
The standard to be applied in establishing an article 37 discrimina-
tion cannot be derived from the monopoly's own purchase and
sales policy. Rather, this standard must be found in the prevailing
conditions of supply or marketing in markets free from quantitative
restrictions. Will the realization of the recommendations of the
Commission lead to such a free market?78 Although the Commission
deferred the question, it had to proceed provisionally from certain
standards whereby discriminations could be determined. One of the
standards used is the average cost of production of the monopoly;
yet these costs are no objective standard. They are to a large degree
functionally related to price policy which is in turn a matter of
77. The French text appears to 'support this view: "clu'l 1'expiration de la p~r1odo
de transition soit assur6...." (Emphasis added.).
78. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
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discretion, as is necessarily the allocation of overhead and joint
costs to specific phases of production or distribution. All of these
costs will be allocated in harmony with a. general market strategy.7 9
Furthermore, the supervision of sales prices; which the Commission
has set up for the purpose of preventing unreasonably low prices in
relation to production costs, would call for a permanent supervision
of business policy. The very fact that such a supervision would be
necessary illustrates that state trading monopolies would, remain
removed from conditions of undistorted competition.
Another standard provisionally applied- by the Commission is
"market saturation." Comparable objections apply since the saturation
of the market is related to sales and price policy. The price policy
may determine the quantity of sales just as the quantity sold may
determine prices. Consequently, the price policy may be used to
manipulate the volume of sales as effectively as direct quantitative
restrictions. Every firm must take into account this interdependence
of price policy and sales volume. What has been said with respect
to prices applies to all other elements of sales policy; the classification
of goods into price groups, the delineation of sub-markets, advertising
policy, the geographical diversification of distribution, and the
methods of introducing new products are necessarily determined by
overall market strategy. As long as a state trading monopoly exercises
an exclusive right of import and export, it must take into account the
effects of its sales policy on the market position of competitive- goods.
The possibility of abuse is-inherent in such a sales policy which has
effects on both domestic and foreign competitive products. The
monopoly necessarily maintains control over the entry of competitors
into its market. The exercise of this control leads to inherent dis-
crimination if compared with those market conditions which would
prevail in the absence of all quantitative restrictions. Free entry to
all markets in interstate trade, as guaranteed by the Treaty's policy
of open markets, will prevail only if the state trading monopolys
competitors are in a position to determine their own sales policy in
the market of that monopoly.
This interpretation of article 37 paragraph I gains support from
article 37 paragraph 3, subparagraphed 2. There it is provided that,
until the adjustments provided for -in article 37 paragraph 1 have
been effected, the Commission may authorize the remaining member
states to impose protective measures with respect to products subject
to state trading monopolies. The provision leaves no doubt that
conditions of "supply and marketing", as regards the nationals of
member states call for a comparison of the monopolized market with
79. The cases where prices are loweied belk -direct 6osts 'of producffon are so
rare that they may be disr6garded.
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the market for the monopolized goods in the other member states.
This is so because protective measures against the monopoly may be
imposed by the member states in their national markets. Thus, the
Treaty excludes the state trading monopoly's own distributive organ-
ization as the standard by which to determine whether conditions of
supply or marketing are discriminatory. The fact that a state trading
monopoly deals with selected distributors only, and that, consequently,
domestic distributors do not enjoy free access to the monopolized
goods, does not justify the exclusion of nationals of other member
states. Such an interpretation, as noted, would confer upon the
member states the power to exclude nationals of other member
states from entry into the market by establishing a restrictive dis-
tributive organization in the market of the monopoly.
Article 37 paragraph 3, subparagraphed 2 assumes that the adjust-
ment of state trading monopolies will render unnecessary protective
measures by the member states at the end of the transitional period.
At that time the Commission and the member states are to rely solely
upon the rules of competition to prevent competitive distortions. This
is feasible, however, only if the adjustment leads to the abolition of
the exclusive right of import or export vis-a'-vis the other member
states.
D. Article 37 Paragraph 2: The "Stand-Still Clause"
In accordance with the general policy of the Treaty to freeze all
restrictions of interstate trade as of the effective date of the Treaty
to prevent the erection of new trade barriers, article 37 paragraph 2
contains a special "stand-still clause" prohibiting member states from
introducing "any new measure which is contrary to the principles laid
down in paragraph 1 of this Article or which restricts the scope of
the Articles dealing with the abolition of customs duties and quanti-
tative restrictions between Member States." In the Costa case,80
interpretative problems concerning the "stand-still clause" were pre-
sented in the context of the Italian nationalization of the production
and distribution of electrical energy. Since the issue was raised before
an Italian court by the defendant in a civil action, the threshold
inquiry was whether article 37 paragraph 2 gives rise to individual
rights that must be safeguarded by the domestic courts.
1. The Direct Effect of the Provision.-In the now famous Tarif-
commissie case,3' it was settled that the Treaty may create individual
rights with respect to provisions addressed to the member states. The
court there based its ruling on the legal character of the Community
as a "new legal order in international law for the benefit of which
80. Havana Charter, Chapter IV, Section D, Arts. 29-32.
81. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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the Member States have, albeit to a limited extent, surrendered their
sovereign rights, and whose subjects are not only the Member States
but individuals as well."82 Article 12 was held to give rise to such
individual rights:8 3 "The text of Article 12 lays down a clear and
unconditional prohibition which involves a negative rather than a
positive duty. In any case, such obligation does not carry with it the
reservation that the States may subordinate its functioning to a positive
act of internal law."M On this basis the Court held that the article
12 prohibition "lends itself perfectly to producing direct effects in legal
relations between the Member States and persons under their jurisdic-
tion."Ss
In this context the question as to direct effects of article 37 para-
graph 2 had to be answered. Advocate General Lagrange suggested a
differentiation between the first and second clauses of article 37 para-
graph 2. He thought article 37 paragraph 2, in referring to new
measures contrary to the principles laid down in paragraph 1, too
uncertain a prohibition to give rise to individual rights. As to new
measures restricting the scope of the articles dealing with the abolition
of customs duties and quantitative restrictions, he arrived at the
contrary conclusion, stressing the direct analogy with articles 12 and
31 and the Tarifcommissie case.8 The Court of Justice did not accept
this differentiation, but ruled article 37 paragraph 2 as a whole
productive of individual rights.87
2. The Scope of the Provision.-As to the substance of this duty
imposed upon the member states, the Court differentiates the purpose
of the stand-still obligation and the means to thwart that purpose.
The purpose is to prevent new discriminations within the meaning of
article 37 paragraph 1. The means to discriminate are article 37
organizations. All new organizations are therefore prohibited because
they would tend to introduce new discriminations.
82. Id. at 25, 2 CCH Com. MKT. REP. at 7214.
83. Art. 12 reads: "Member States shall refrain from introducing, as between
themselves, any new customs duties on imports or exports or any changes having
equivalent effect, and from increasing those which they already levy on their trade
with each other."
84. Rechtssache 26/62. N. V. Allegemene Transport -en Expedite Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v. Niederl~indische Finanzverwaltung, IX Sammlung 1, 25 (1963)
2 CCH Com. MKT. REP. ff 8008, at 7214-15.
85. Id. at 25-26, 2 CCH CoM. ML-r. REP. at 7215.
86. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 52, at 1303-05; 2 CCH
Com. MxT. REP. 7403-04.
87. "A prohibition so clearly expressed, that has come into force with the Treaty
throughout the entire Community and has therefore been incorporated into the legal
systems of the Member States, is the very law of these States and is of direct
concern to their nationals, for whose benefit it entails individual rights which the
national courts must safeguard." Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 52, at 1275, 2 CGH
Conf. MKT. REP. at 7392.
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It is apparent that the concept of discrimination once again
determines the scope of the prohibition. That the Court did not rule
on this interpretation has been previously noted. The Commission,
however, submitting its views to the Court, was more specific in its
interpretation of article 37 than in its recommendations. It agreed
that, although article 222 might sanction nationalization, "the creation
of a new monopoly is not permitted . ."88 This opinion suggests
that an organization under article 37 paragraph 1 will create dis-
criminatory conditions which are incompatible with the Treaty.
The Court did not interpret the second part of article 37 paragraph
2, relating to the abolition of customs duties and quantitative restric-
tions. It did point out, however, that article 37 was to be interpreted
within the framework of the chapter on "'elimination of quantitative
restrictions between the Member States."' 89
Administrative experience with article 37 paragraph 2 is limited.
The Commission, in answer to an inquiry in the European Parliament,
reported that there was the question of a violation of article 37
paragraph 2 in several cases but that it had not to date initiated
proceedings. It also reported that the case of the French petroleum
system, the validity of which had been extended beyond the end of
the transitional period, would be considered together with the basic
issues of interpretation under article 37.10
E. The Relation of Article 37 to Other Rules of the Treaty
Effects of state trading monopolies are so widespread that issues
under article 37 relate to various other provisions of the Treaty. It
is appropriate, therefore, to deal with these questions as such and to
place the scheme of article 37 into the wider perspective of the
Common Market as a whole. As is readily apparent, article 37
provisions concerning state trading monopolies may take precedence
over general treaty provisions. However, the extent of this precedence
allows of considerable controversy.
1. Free Movement of Goods (Part Two, Title I).-As has been
shown in detail,91 article 37 covers discriminations on the basis of
product origin, whereas article 9 paragraph 2 defines the scope of the
customs union: "The provisions of Chapter I Section 1 and of
88. Supra note 52, at 1267, 2 CCH CoM. Mi-r. REP'. at 7389. It is not readily
apparent whether the Commission has reversed its position in suggesting at the
same time that a finding as to whether the creation of a trading monopoly was
contrary to art. 37 para. 2 might be dispensed with, if imports or exports did not
depend upon the discretionary power of the state organization. See also, Pappalardo,
supra note 75, at 223-26 (Art. 37 No. 6).
89. Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 52, at 1275, 2 CCH Com. MKT. REP. at 7392.
f90. Response to Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40.
91. See text, pp. 340-41.
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Chapter 2 of this Title... [Part Two, Title I] shall apply to products
originating in Member States and to products which come from third
countries and which are entitled to free circulation in Member
States." The operative provision is article 10.92 Since article 37 is to
be found in that part of the Treaty referred to in article 9 paragraph
2, the provisions of article 10 appear applicable to products covered by
a state trading monopoly. Although reserving its final position on
this point, the Commission apparently considers article 37 obliga-
tions with respect to the free circulation of products originating in
third countries deferred until the establishment of the common
commercial policy (articles 110-16) 93
It has been found "surprising" that the Commission failed to take
issue with the "unwarranted" position of the French Government
denying the applicability of articles 9 and 10 in the context of
article 37.94 There is indeed no provision conditioning applicability
of the customs union provisions upon the establishment of a common
commercial policy towards third countries. Neither does the purpose
of article 37 demand an exemption. State trading monopolies are
accorded special treatment not because of the member states' interest
in limiting competition from products originating in third countries,
but in order to facilitate the adjustment of these organizations to the
the requirements of the free movement of goods within the Common
Market-including all products "entitled to free circulation" in a
member state. Within this framework repercussions on the functions
of state trading monopolies vis-a-vis third countries are clearly ac-
cepted by the Treaty.
2. The Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (Part Two, Chapter
II).-The systematic position of article 37 poses the question of its
relation to the more general provisions of chapter 2. The, Court of
Justice in the Sopeco case found "no reason... to settle the question
92. Art. 10 para. 1 reads:
Products which come from a third country shall be deemed to be entitled- to
free circulation in a Member State if the necessary import formalities have been
complied with and the appropriate customs duties or charges having equivalent
effect have been levied in that Member State and if such products have not
benefited from a total or partial drawback of such duties or charges.
93. Response to Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40.
94. Van Heeke, supra note 50, at 460-61. In accord with the view that arts.
9 and 10 apply to products covered by art. 37 organizations see Collard, supra
note 63, at 269; Wiirdinger, supra note 64, at 276. Each of the above writers
discusses the French petroleum system and deals with the question whether crude
oil imported from third countries into a member state after having been refined there
or admitted to "free circulation" is entitled to the protection of the anti-discriminhtion
rule of art. 37.
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of whether the application of article 37 to national monopolies does
or does not preclude the application of any other provision of the
chapter concerning the abolition of quantitative restrictions .... ",5
There, Advocate General Gand argued that "[A]rticle 37 alone is ap-
plicable ipso jure.... [T]he preceding provisions of the same chapter
are applicable only in so far as Article 37 refers to them . . .,DO
The views of the Advocate General thus* accord with those submitted
to the Court by the Commission and the French Government-views
which reflect the prevalent opinion among legal writers.97  The
Government of the Netherlands, however, insisted that articles 30
to 37 were a unity directed to the elimination of quantitative restric-
tions and that there were no functional distinctions among (1)
quantitative restrictions, (2) measures of equivalent effect and (3)
measures concerning state trading.98 Schilling holds articles 33 and
37 applicable concurrently in the event of a quota for monopolized
:products.99 Mr. Justice Strauss observes that, according to the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, all measures having effects
equivalent to quantitative restrictions are in essence discriminatory
and are, therefore, of the same nature as the measures covered by
article 37. He therefore does not think it useful to distinguish these
concepts:
They are related to the same kind of measures; the different phrasing
may be due to the fact that in one case measures of the state as such
are concerned, while in the other case (typically) the measures are to
be attributed to an institution which, though it pertains to the state, acts
as an enterprise at the same time.100
This opinion indicates the criteria upon which a decision of the issue
must be based. The purpose of article 37 is not to grant state trading
monopolies a preferential treatment. Rather, the elimination of quan-
titative restrictions is to be effected by taking into account the special
character of state trading monopolies. This is particularly apparent
from article 37 paragraph 2 which, while reiterating the stand-still
05. S.A.R.L. Albatros v. SOPECO, supra note 57, at 10, 2 CCH Com. Mir. REP.
at 7442.
96. Conclusions of Advocate General Gand, supra note 52, at 24, 2 CCH Coam.
Mrcr. REP. at 7449-50.
97. CATALANO, op. cit. supra note 64, at 340; Fourr6 & Wenner, Der EWG-Vertrag
in der Gerichtspraxis (Artikel 37 und 177), AussEmvmTscHAFTSD1ENST D)s BEnTns-
BERATERS 149 (1965); GLAESNER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 101 (Art. 37 Anm. 1);
Wiirdinger, supra note 64, at 274; as to the Commission's view see Response to
Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40; Van Hecke, supra note 50, at 454.
98. S.A.R.L. Albatros v. SOPECO, supra note 57, at 5; 2 CCII Coms. MKT. REP,
at 7439.
99. Schilling, supra note 65, at 698.
100. Strauss, supra note 67, at 531-32 (author's transl.).
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clauses of articles 12 and 31, adds that the "Scope" of these latter
articles must not be restricted. The allowance for a "certain margin
of assessment,"101 if compared with articles 12 and 31, is certainly not
due to a less strict prohibition. It takes into account only the amal-
gamation of commercial and political considerations typical of state
trading monopolies. The general rules on quantitative restrictions
should therefore obtain, except insofar as the nature of article 37
organizations demands the special treatment provided. Wherever
there are quantitative restrictions or new measures of equivalent effect
recognizable as such under the general rules, these rules are appli-
cable. This interpretation does not create a collision between article
37 and article 33 (as suggested by Advocate General Gant in the
Sopeco case). Article 37 takes precedence whenever, but only inso-
far as, effects equivalent to quantitative restrictions are inseparably
interwoven with the monopoly's market conduct.
3. Special Rules Modifying Article 37.-Special rules of the Treaty
may modify or take precedence over article 37. In respect of state
trading monopolies designed to facilitate the distribution of agricul-
tural products, article 37 paragraph 4 calls for the concurrent con-
sideration of the aims of the Community agricultural policy; more
particularly, equivalent guarantees for the employment and the
standard of living of the producers concerned are to be provided. The
Commission deduced from the words "the rules in this article shall be
given effect . . ." that article 37 paragraph 4 did not exclude the
applicability of article 37 as such; the only exemption, according to
the Commission, concerns tobacco products made of French tobacco
leaves, and the only allowance is for a different time table and for
different methods of adjustment.0 2 In its 1966 general report, the
Commission refers to the necessity of relating the adjustment of the
tobacco monopolies in France and Italy to the establishment of a
common marketing organization for tobacco leaf in the context of
the agricultural policy.1' 3
In this report the Commission points to other policies as well, such
as the energy policy, which is to be considered, even without a
qualifying Treaty rule, in the context of article 37.104 More partic-
ularly, in the adjustment of the French petroleum import regulation,
the objectives of a common energy policy, to be determined in the
101. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 52, at 1304, 2 CCH
Comr. MKr. Ri . at 7404.
102. Recommendation to the French Government (tobacco), April 6, 1962,
AMTSBLATT 1500 (1962). Recommendations to the French and German Governments
(alcohol) Nov. 26, 1963, AMTSBLATT 2857 (1963).




future, should be taken into account. 1 5 This modifies the Commission's
1963 recommendation where it had been emphasized that the applica-
tion of article 37 could be conditioned neither upon the realization
of other Treaty objectives nor upon the establishment of a common
energy policy.1'6 The implications of the Commission's policy will be
clarified as soon as the announced new article 37 recommendations
are issued.
Of general importance is the exemption of article 90 paragraph 2.
It may cover all enterprises irrespective of the applicability of articles
37 or 90 paragraph 1. We are concerned with its relevance concern-
ing article 37 only. In this context, the exemption of fiscal monopolies
is particularily important since trading monopolies frequently do serve
as fiscal monopolies as well. The rules of the Treaty are applicable
only insofar "as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
de jure or de facto fulfillment of the specific tasks entrusted to such
concerns." In order to establish the scope of the exemption, it is
necessary to ascertain to what extent the application of the rules
of the Treaty would prejudice the special functions of these enter-
prises; there is no blanket exemption. The Commission has taken
the view that a fiscal monopoly is privileged only with respect to its
task of securing revenues. This task, according to the Commission, is
not obstructed by the application of article 37: "In order to provide
for equal state revenues it is sufficient to unify the mark-up between
costs of production and sales price with respect to domestic and
imported products in such a way that the new mark-up corresponds to
the weighted average of the former mark-ups." 1 7 The position taken
by the Italian government and by ENEL in the Costa case that the
rules on free movement of goods in general, and article 37 and the
rules of competition in particular, are inapplicable to the operation of
a nationalized public service was, by implication, rejected by the
court.108 Advocate General Lagrange, however, referred to article 90
paragraph 2 to show that a public service is not as such excluded from
article 37.109
4. The Rules of Competition (Articles 85 to 90 Paragraph 1).-There
has been as yet no pronouncement by the Court of Justice or by the
105. Ibid.
106. Recommendation to the French Government July 24, 1963, (mineral oil),
Al-rsn&rr 2271 (1963).
107. Recommendation to the French Government April 6, 1962, (tobacco),
AUrrsBrLAr 1500 (1962) (author's transl.).
108. Rechtssache 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., X Sammlung 1254, 1276 (1964), 2 CCH
Com. MKT. REP. ff 8023, at 7393 (1964). See Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-
Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the Costa Case, 63 Mici. L. REv. 491
(1965).
109. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, supra note 108, at 1303; 2 CCH
Com. MKT. REP. at 7403.
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Commission with respect to the applicability of the rules of competi-
tion to article 37 organizations. In the absence of article 37, the
conduct of state trading monopolies as such would be governed by
the rules of competition, while the member states would be subject
to article 90 paragraph 1. The rules of competition are of course
fully applicable during the transitional period, at least since the
promulgation of regulation No. 17 implementing these provisions in
accordance with article 87.110 In this respect article 37 confers a
privilege upon the member states, the gradual adjustment constituting
an exemption during the transitional period."' At the end of the transi-
tional period, however, the functions of article 37 devolve upon the
rules of competition. This follows, at any rate, from the author's
interpretation of the basic rule of nondiscrimination in article 37
paragraph 1.
The opinion of the Commission that the introduction of new
restrictive measures after the expiration of the transitional period
would violate article 37112 is not at odds with that of the author. As
long as monopolies exist as organizations and function with respect
to third countries, it is conceivable that new restrictive measures will
be introduced in spite of their adjustment. In such a case article 37
paragraph 2 may be applicable, together with the rules of competition.
But a policy of non-discrimination will then no longer suffice to
comply with the rules of the Treaty. All commercial activities of the
member states are to be integrated into the system of undistorted
competition. In this way the policy of the Community toward article
37 state trading monopolies merges into the general policy of
competition as it concerns those enterprises specified in article 90
paragraphs 1 and 2.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop even the outlines of
such a policy. So far neither the Court of Justice nor the Commission
has had the opportunity to apply article 90 paragraph 1. However,
Commissioner von der Groeben, addressing the European Parliament,
has stressed the importance of regulating public enterprises in the
framework of a system of undistorted competition." 3 The further the
customs union progresses, the greater will be the tendency to resort
to public enterprises as instruments of influencing intra-Community
110. See Rechtssache 13/61 Kleding-Verkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v.
Robert Bosch GmbH, VIII Sammlung 105, (1962), 2 CCH Com. M-r. R P. I[ 8003
(1962).
111. See CATALANO, op. cit. supra note 64, at 340-41; MEsTmAcKEm, Offene
Mdrkte im System Unverfdlschten Wettbewerbs, in WiRTscHAToRDNJNG uND
REcHrsoRDNuNG, F EsTsCHMr FUR FRANZ BOHM 359 (1965).
112. Response to Inquiry No. 51, supra note 40.
113. Address by Commissioner von der Groeben, European Parliament in Stras-
bourg, June 16, 1965 (publication of the Commission).
1967 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
trade. This is by no means the only reason why public enterprises
are of utmost importance in the Common Market. There are divergent
and partly conflicting views concerning the role of public enterprises
within the national economy-views which are influenced by national
economic policy in general, by concepts of governmental functions
in the economy, by the tradition of using public enterprises as instru-
ments of public policy, by the quantitative extent of the public sector,
and by a variety of other considerations of national policy (and
politics), n 4 To the extent that these policies are "liable to affect
trade between member states" (article 85 paragraph 1), they are a
matter of Community concern. The development of a common
policy in this sector will be determined by the future transformation
of the Common Market from a customs union to an economic union.
The task of regulating public enterprises within a competitive system,
and, indeed, through competition, leads to largely unmapped fields
of economic policy. This is especially true of the regulation of the
public sector within the Common Market.
The legal institutions governing public enterprises in the member
states are different in technique and philosophy; nevertheless, the
rules of the Treaty must be applied to all comparable organizations
with equivalent effect on the basis of an autonomous interpretation.
The economic policies of the member states recognize a relation of
competition and public enterprise in varying degrees, and they ascribe
quite different roles to competition in general. Nevertheless, the
system of undistorted competition must be devised and implemented
so as to establish equal competitive conditions in intra-Community
trade. And this task must be accomplished under circumstances
where private and public enterprises of various member states are
increasingly competing in the same markets. The Treaty pro,ides
the legal tools to develop a common policy and rules of competition
tailored to the requirements of these markets. And there is a growing
awareness of the central role these issues are going to play. 15 The
114. For an excellent survey of the current problems of economic policy in the
public sector from the point of view of a French economist, but not limited to the
French economy, compare Houss.Aux, THE COrmEzCE or Acn'xoNs: THE Com-
PATIBILTY OF DEcIsioN-TAxING BY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENTERPIUSES, REP'T TO TIlE
IArr'. CoNF. OF THE INT'L EcoNr. AssN, Biarritz, Sept. 2-9, 1966.
115. See colloquium organized by the International League against Unfair Compe-
tition in Brussels, March 1963, "Competition between Public and Private Enterprises
Within the Framework of Article 90 of the Rome Treaty" (unpublished); BOnN-n,
Rechtsfragen zu Artikel 90 EWG-Vertrag, in Verdffentlichungen des Instituts far
Energierecht an der Universitilt zu Kdin (Heft 12/13, WEERMEcRT UND EUnOPAISCI.S
Wm-rmL:vmsnREcnT) (1966); HAcic, ZuR AUSLEGUNG DES ARTIKL 90 (2) EWO-
VF.RTRAG uND DESSEN BEDEUTUNG FUR DIE ELEK'EItzrrATsw-TsciriAFTS, (DlssimATboN,
MAnz 1966); HuTH, op. cit. supra note 68; MESTzACKER, op. cit. supra note 111;
Deringer, The Interpretation of Article 90 (2) of the E.E.C. Treaty, 2 CoM. MT.
L. REv. 129 (1964).
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close interdependence of the policy of open markets in the customs
union and the establishment of a system of undistorted competition
determines the outlines of this policy. Not only do the rules of
competition limit and circumscribe the conduct of private enterprises,
they emerge as standards for the member states acting through enter-
prises as well.
It has been suggested that the relevance of article 90 paragraph 1
cannot be found in its substantive meaning, but rather in the remedies
provided in article 90 paragraph 3.116 The member states, it is
argued, must in accordance with article 5 paragraph 1 abstain from
any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives
of the Treaty. This argument does not take into account the systematic
position of article 90. The Treaty distinguishes between the Treaty
objectives as spelled out in article 2 and the instruments by which
these objectives are to be attained. That the system of undistorted
competition is one of the instruments by which the objectives of the
Treaty are to be realized admits of no controversy. The prohibition
of article 90 paragraph 1 goes beyond the obligation of the member
states not to jeopardize the general objectives of the Community.
Article 90 paragraph 1 thus precludes the argument that the objectives
of the Treaty might be more effectively attained by public enterprises
operating outside the ambit of the rules of competition. This is
without prejudice to the limited exemption of article 90 paragraph 2.
The duty and the right of the Commission to give effect to article
90 paragraph 1 by issuing appropriate directives or decisions to the
member states (article 90 paragraph 3) confirms, the relevance of
article 90 as a matter of substantive law. The task thereby imposed
goes beyond that of article 169 to such a degree as to indicate a
difference in the substance of the Commission's jurisdiction.
The adjustment of state trading monopolies under article 37 thus
proves to be the prologue to a more fundamental task of the Com-
munity-to develop a unified system of undistorted competition for
both private and public enterprises. Alexander Hamilton's counsel
in commenting upon the effects of a commercial policy peculiar to
each state, occasioning "distinctions, preferences, and exclusions,"
perfectly summarizes the foundation and the implication of this part
of the Community's policy of competition: 'We should be ready to
denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable
acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest."" 7
116. See Deringer, Das Wettbewerbsrecht der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
(WmTscHr ur,'N WmnEmvnR) Art. 90 Ann. 24; Art. 90 Anm. 47 n.34; Van Hecke,
Government Enterprises and National Monopolies under the E.E.C. Treaty, 3 ComON
Mi-r. L. REv. 450, 452 (1966). Contra MES.AcKma, op. cit. supra note 111, at 383.
117. Tr FmmLuiSr No. 7, at 37 (Modem Library ed. 1941) (Hamilton).
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